On February 4, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio chaired the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial Meeting, bringing together representatives from more than 50 countries. The United States announced that it had reached cooperation consensus with Japan, Mexico and the European Union on the development of critical mineral resources, with formal agreements expected to be signed in the near term.
A 'De-Chinaization' Minerals Alliance?
The meeting went beyond routine diplomacy, serving as a public declaration of a coordinated geoeconomic strategy aimed at reshaping global critical minerals supply chains and reducing dependence on China.
Key outcomes include:
• Formation of a Core Alliance Framework
The United States and Japan contribute technology and capital, Mexico provides resource endowments and geographic advantages, while the European Union offers market access and advanced processing capabilities. Together, they outline an initial closed-loop cooperation model covering resources, processing, technology and end markets.
• Signing of an Implementation Roadmap
Participants agreed to complete Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) or concrete action plans within defined timelines, translating political consensus into operational projects such as joint exploration, investment development and processing facility construction.
• A Strong Signal to Global Mining Capital
Washington made clear that U.S.-led 'friend-shoring' and supply chain restructuring are accelerating, urging global investors and producers to make strategic alignment choices sooner rather than later.
Why Is the United States Moving So Urgently?
The U.S. faces mounting structural vulnerabilities in critical mineral supply. Domestic resource constraints, the long-term absence of civilian strategic reserves, and the lessons drawn from China's 2025 rare earth export control countermeasures have heightened concerns over supply choke points.
In January 2026 alone, Washington rolled out a series of measures to address what it describes as a critical minerals 'survival crisis':
• January 12: U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent convened a G7-plus meeting on critical minerals with Australia, India and South Korea.
• January 14: The U.S. classified reliance on foreign processing of critical minerals as a national security threat and set a 180-day negotiation window.
• January 26: Former President Donald Trump announced USD 1.6 billion in combined debt and equity financing for a U.S. rare earth company.
• February 2: Trump unveiled the 'National Vault Plan', with the U.S. Export-Import Bank approving USD 10 billion in loans.
• February 4: The first Critical Minerals Ministerial Meeting was officially convened.
China remains the dominant global midstream processing hub for critical minerals. Through alliance-based coordination, the United States is seeking to dilute China's control over processing bottlenecks and secure long-term influence over advanced manufacturing and defense-related supply chains.
In 2025, China's foreign trade continued to record a substantial surplus. Surplus sources were concentrated in the United States, the European Union, ASEAN and selected emerging markets, while deficits were mainly with Chinese Taiwan, South Korea and Australia—key suppliers of raw materials and critical components.
This reflects a clear 'dual circulation' trade structure: China imports core components and raw materials from East Asian resource economies, while exporting manufactured goods to Western consumer markets and the Global South, generating persistent trade surpluses.
Will China's Minerals Sector Lose Ground?
China's critical minerals trade deficit continues to widen. Export controls imposed by overseas resource countries, combined with alliance-based containment, are driving up import costs for raw materials while constraining exports of processed products. In 2026, the rare earth sector alone has recorded a trade deficit of nearly 40,000 tonnes, valued at approximately RMB 9.2 billion, with surpluses in mineral processing products steadily narrowing.
Export markets and orders are also under direct pressure. Alliance members—including the U.S., EU, Japan and Mexico—are prioritizing intra-bloc procurement of minerals and processed products. They are expected to invoke provisions of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to coordinate non-tariff barriers with allies, further compressing market space for China's mineral processing exports.
As critical minerals increasingly sit at the intersection of trade, security and industrial policy, the global competition over supply chains is entering a more explicit and confrontational phase.